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Abstract
The request for on-line privacy is rapidly increasing. More and more Internet users
realize that information about their on-line activities is highly valuable information for
commercial companies and open for potential abuse. Information about who communi-
cates with whom, and who accesses which services, is already used to improve on-line
services, e.g. by serving more relevant on-line advertisements which many appreciate.
But the problem of letting large commercial companies know your entire surﬁng history
does not seem to be of major concern to the average Internet user. Future services may
look into how to prevent this type of information leakage, but this will not help the
users of today. In addition, anonymous publication of information, e.g. by dissidents
and whistle-blowers, is made nearly impossible for today’s Internet users. There exists
a need for censorship-resistant Internet services, where anonymous publishing of infor-
mation can be made. These types of services are already starting to appear. They are
combined with anonymizing technologies, and designed to be attack-resistant, accessi-
ble from anywhere, have a hidden physical location, and therefore they will be more
censorship-resistant.
The overall goal of the research work was to address vulnerabilities in, and to develop
new or enhance existing anonymizing network technologies and censorship-resistant ser-
vices. This thesis presents both analyses and new principles to enhance the anonymizing
technology existing today.
The ﬁrst phase of the research work consisted of an analysis of traﬃc ﬂow conﬁden-
tiality in a future military network setting, and an analysis of how to securely anonymize
traﬃc data logs at high-speed interconnections. The thesis presents a new method for
securing these logs by creating transaction speciﬁc pseudonyms without increasing the
amount of logged data. The thesis also presents solutions to allow some elements of the
traﬃc data to be used for statistical analysis and therefore be available for search, while
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other parts of the data could be kept anonymous and unlinked to the searchable data.
The second phase of the research work focuses on technologies inside anonymizing
networks, their vulnerabilities, and proposes methods to increase security to the existing
techniques. The work demonstrates how the predecessor attack works in a live anony-
mizing network and can be used to locate a so-called hidden service within minutes with
only a single compromised node in the network. An analysis of various countermeasures
is also presented together with a recommendation on how to best resist this attack by
using nodes protecting the initial connection to the anonymizing network.
The thesis presents a method of reducing a hidden service’s vulnerability to denial-
of-service attacks by using so-called valet nodes to protect the contact points of the
hidden service. In addition the valet nodes solution enables the use of completely hid-
den services, where even the very existence of the service is hidden from the other users
and from the network itself. The use of valet nodes also supports a method of obtain-
ing ﬂexible quality of service for both authenticated and anonymous users of a hidden
service.
The research work also presents a general improvement of the authenticated Diﬃe-
Hellman key exchange used in building anonymous connections. The solution eliminates
the need for the RSA encryption by using predistributed Diﬃe-Hellman values when
setting up session keys for the anonymous connections. This reduces the number of
encryptions and the number of messages necessary for constructing an anonymous con-
nection while maintaining forward secrecy. The solution is also easily adaptable to the
valet nodes design which will beneﬁt from the use of public Diﬃe-Hellman values and
thereby also avoid the use of RSA. In addition the thesis presents a method to reduce
the latency in a hidden service connection by utilizing the extra protection within the
valet nodes extension.
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Part I
Introduction
1

“Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”
- U.S. Supreme Court decision No. 93-986 April 19, 1995
3
4
1 Introduction
This chapter gives a brief introduction into the background and motivation for the thesis
and describes the thesis’ outline.
1.1 Background and motivation
As the use of the Internet is continuing to increase rapidly, people leave more and
more traces of their on-line activities without being aware of the potential for abuse of
this information, or by simply ignoring them. There are many commercial interests in
(ab)using this information, e.g. why did you join the on-line “chat-room for depressed”,
and why are you looking for information about short time credit card loans?
Besides this obviously private and personal information, there exists areas where
people are in need of publishing information without being identiﬁed. This could be
political dissidents or corporate whistle blowers in need of making information publicly
(or “corporately”) available without having their identities revealed. This so-called
censorship-resistant publishing is an important part of anonymity services, and has until
now received limited attention within the various research communities. Censorship
resistance may be achieved by using hidden services. These services are constructed to
make general Internet services, like publishing services, available from anywhere at any
time, without exposing the IP address and thereby its physical location. Hidden services
thereby makes direct denial-of-service attacks and even physical attacks impossible.
As privacy (cf. Section 2.1) is an important and large part of our oﬄine society,
there has always been a challenge to deﬁne how privacy will be a part of the on-line
community in the use of data communication networks. In cooperation with Gjøvik
University College there were identiﬁed common areas of interest within anonymity
research, like privacy, traﬃc ﬂow conﬁdentiality and censorship-resistant publishing to
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be the basis in the main research areas of the thesis. There had already been identiﬁed
some weaknesses in the location hidden services and this was early identiﬁed as an
interesting area for deeper privacy research.
The challenges identiﬁed during the initial research period have made the research
focus rapidly evolve from traﬃc ﬂow conﬁdentiality, anonymizing network security and
anonymity in high speed data logs, towards attacks and improvements on so-called
hidden services, as will be described in Chapter 3.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is separated into two parts. Part I is an introduction to the ﬁeld of anonymity,
privacy and censorship resistant publishing. Part II contains the published articles
describing the research work of the thesis.
Part I After a brief introduction describing the background, motivation and structure
of the thesis, Chapter 2 gives an overview of the research area and related ﬁelds, in
addition to related work both existing before and completed during the research period.
Chapter 3 describes the research work by summarizing the contributions from the in-
dividual papers, making a brief discussion of the research work, and describe suggested
areas of further research.
Part II This part consists of the following ﬁve research papers:
• Non-expanding Transaction Speciﬁc Pseudonymization for IP Traﬃc Monitoring.
• Traﬃc Flow Conﬁdentiality in a Future Network Enabled Capability Environment.
• Locating Hidden Servers.
• Valet Services: Improving Hidden Servers with a Personal Touch.
• Improving eﬃciency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services.
6
2 Anonymity background
This chapter will present background information on anonymity, hidden services and
censorship resistance to set the thesis’ publications in a relevant context. First some
deﬁnitions are presented in Section 2.1, while Section 2.2 sets the use of anonymity in a
wider perspective. Section 2.3 presents high-latency anonymity, and Section 2.4 presents
a classiﬁcation of low-latency anonymity systems and some relevant low-latency anony-
mity schemes. Section 2.5 describes diﬀerent methods of achieving censorship-resistant
publishing of information, and Section 2.6 brieﬂy describes the the Tor anonymizing
network and the hidden services principle.
2.1 Deﬁnitions
Anonymity originates from the Greek “anonymia” meaning “without a name”. Anony-
mity is used in many diﬀerent settings like common social situations, e.g. story telling
and using cash, to uttering less popular political views, e.g. by the use of public ﬂyers.
This thesis focuses on anonymity in a computer network communication setting which
will be described in this chapter.
The informal use of anonymity simply means that one cannot tell who did what.
More formally the common and most widespread deﬁnition of anonymity is made by
Pﬁtzmann and Hansen [80].
Anonymity is the state of being not identiﬁable within a set of all possible
acting subjects, called the anonymity set.
Anonymity is often evaluated as an absolute value; either you are anonymous, or you
are not. But based on the above deﬁnition, anonymity is a probability based on the
7
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size of the anonymity set one is a part of (cf. Section 2.2.1). Attempting to identify
who is communicating with whom will also divide the deﬁnition into sender anonymity
- for the originator of the message, receiver anonymity - for the receiver of the mes-
sage, and relationship anonymity - against the linking of senders and receivers. Most
anonymity systems focus on sender anonymity, e.g. a user is sending an anonymous
message or requesting information anonymously from a public website. Anonymity is
not cryptography, as cryptography only hides the content of the communication channel
and not those involved. But cryptography often plays a strong part in the construction
of anonymity systems. Neither is anonymity the same as steganography [56]. The main
objective of steganography is to hide the very existence of the communication, creating
unobservability.
Strong anonymity will prevent the linking of two transactions (or separable actions)
to the same identity.
Pseudonymity can be viewed as the use of roles instead of personal identities. The
role acts as a representation (pseudonym) of the person using this role over time, but
without connecting this role to the real persons identity, comparable to a nickname.
The term anonymity suﬀers under the attention it gets from the abuse of the freedom
it provides. Therefore other more acceptable terms have arisen in diﬀerent areas which
basically means the same. In the technical deﬁnition of computer network anonymity,
businesses use the term network security when trying to protect their resources, mili-
tary networks often discuss traﬃc ﬂow conﬁdentiality and traﬃc analysis resistance to
counter information leakage, while private citizens relates mostly to the term privacy.
Traﬃc ﬂow conﬁdentiality and traﬃc analysis resistance deﬁnes how a network is
able to hide the communication patterns of the network, e.g. who communicates with
whom.
Privacy is all about an individual being in control of what personal information that
is to be distributed to whom. In an Internet setting this information can be “everything”
related to this person, e.g. personal identity, home address, email address, private emails,
web pages visited last three months, bank account information, etc. Privacy is not to
hide this information, but to protect and verify who has access to what information.
Censorship resistant publishing describes methods of disseminating information se-
curely and anonymously, without letting non-authorized users remove or change infor-
8
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mation, and without allowing anyone to make the information unavailable.
2.2 Anonymity and free speech
Article 19 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights expresses:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right in-
cludes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Freedom of the press is a well established principle in democratic countries and
viewed as one of the fundamental rights for their citizens. Most people expect that
this fundamental right also applies in other areas where expressions can be published,
like on the Internet. The technology and evolution of Internet usage is faster than any
other previous technological development, and therefore laws are often constructed on
the basis of isolated incidents[1, 91] rather than put into a more complete perspective
before they are implemented. If the government required every person to wear a GPS-
tracker1 so that anyone could be asked to prove his/her whereabouts upon request, e.g.
in abduction cases, terrorist activities, etc., the majority would hopefully never accept
this even if it could assist in solving many crimes. But by pointing out existing and
potential abuse scenarios, the same principle is about to be introduced on Internet usage
and on-line activity [36] in several countries.
Existing and potential abuse is an important aspect of Internet anonymity. Unfor-
tunately there are abusers of the diﬀerent types of anonymity services like there are
abusers in all other areas of society, and this will remain a fact also in the future. Cash
may be the simplest analogy as cash on the one side allows the public to be anonymous
in most ordinary transactions and on the other side can be abused e.g. to avoid taxes.
Most illegal activities are still illegal even if they are fulﬁlled by (ab)using the Internet,
and this will unfortunately not disappear by prohibiting new technology. This situation
is exactly why we have laws to inform the public of what is deemed legal and illegal be-
havior, and this is currently also how we deﬁne legitimate Internet usage. One problem
with this is that a global computer network is only slightly inﬂuenced by local (country
1A Global Positioning System tracker will store your position at all times. These systems already
exists and products implementing these in teenage-model cell phones [92], sneakers [110], hidden car
devices and more [26], are all available today.
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based) laws and regulations as the services are easily moved from one jurisdiction to
another. Some content is illegal in a few countries, like selling Nazi-related material
over Internet in France, but legal (even if disputed) in other countries. Similarly it is
illegal to drive above the speed limit, but we do not enforce all cars to report continuous
speed and position reports of every trip 2 for complete monitoring even if this is now
technically possible. The authorities still accepts that it has to provide some freedom
to its “users”, the citizens, but the government should be prepared to take action if
someone abuses that trust.
Currently there is a push for making every user’s on-line activity traceable, often
with references to serious abuse cases within Internet communication. The EU data
retention directive [36] will enforce every service provider to store information about
Internet (and phone) activity for a period of “at least six months and not more than two
years”. Typical logged data will be information about the IP address used (location),
who the user communicated with, and what they did, e.g. email sent and received and
which web sites the user visited. The directive is to be implemented in the EU region
by 15 September 2007, but may be delayed by 18 months for the areas of Internet access
and usage by individual countries.
But Internet users are also leaving vast amounts of information to commercial com-
panies about their on-line activity. This may be by accident, by lack of knowledge for
how this information can be abused, or simply by not knowing how to avoid leaving
sensitive data. This is the very core of the privacy deﬁnition given in Section 2.1; being
in control of who learns what about yourself. The value of this information is enormous3
and most Internet users do not seem to mind giving this information away. However,
there may exist times when a user is aware of the privacy risks and would like to be
certain of having privacy. This can be in situations where we have taken privacy for
granted but, without knowledge, might not have privacy or anonymity after all. Today
there exists challenges in not giving away on-line identity, originator, or organization,
in many diﬀerent scenarios, e.g. when:
• sending or receiving a private email (or instant message),
• searching for personal health information,
2Not very surprising this is a method currently under development to enforce automatic toll payment
on roads. It will not take long before other areas of use are suggested.
3Information contained in people’s searches and their on-line usage, interests and habits, is the very
foundation for companies like Google, Yahoo, Lycos, and many others.
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• investigators are accessing open/public information about suspects,
• informants want to give the police on-line anonymous tips,
• journalists try to protect their sources,
• political dissidents attempt to publish information.
These are only a few of the anonymity scenarios the public are familiar with, but
where anonymity on-line may be lost in the near future.
At the time of writing there are many products, services and technologies, that
can give anonymity of some degree, but mostly only in single usage areas, e.g. The
Anonymizer [4] for Internet browsing, Mixmaster [71] for anonymous email, etc. Anony-
mous publication and dissemination of information have been cumbersome and insecure.
Until now anonymous publishing have often been completed using an anonymizing web
service or anonymous email tools for accessing public or commercial publishing services
and distributing information from there. But as these services are available to all, they
are also open for pressure to be shut down, e.g. by denial-of-service attacks, or legal
attacks on the publishing service provider. Existing solutions for anonymous publishing
will be described in Section 2.5.
Privacy enhancing technologies (PET) have been under development since the early
1990s, and are still undergoing rapid evolution to provide privacy protection for Internet
users. Many of these diﬀerent technologies will be described in this chapter, but a short
summary of the early PET systems can be found in Goldberg et al. [44, 42]. Other
related and often connected areas like digital cash [95, 54] and e-voting [53] will not be
addressed as they are separate areas of research.
2.2.1 Degrees of anonymity
Another challenge in anonymity research is the “level of anonymity”, e.g. how can we
measure and quantify the anonymity given in an anonymity service or even in a speciﬁc
situation.
Reiter and Rubin [87] presented a degree of anonymity ranging from absolute privacy,
via degrees of innocence and suspicion, to provably exposed. Goldberg [41] deﬁned The
Nymity Slider presenting a scale of anonymity ranging from verinymity, e.g. proof of
identiﬁcation, to unlinkable anonymity where the identity cannot be recovered. Berthold
et al. [11] deﬁned the mixer network secure if at least one of the mixer nodes in the
11
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cascade could be trusted. The probability of this is P = 1 − al, where a is the part
of attackers in the network and l is the length of the route. Dı´az et al. [28] described
the degree of anonymity after an attack as the systems current entropy divided by the
maximum entropy of the system.
For the Tor network (cf. Section 2.6), the probability of a user connection being
compromised is often simpliﬁed to the probability of an attacker controlling both the
entrance and exit node of the network. If an attacker controls c of the n server nodes
in the network, the probability of being secure is 1− ( c
n
)2 if all nodes are selected with
equal probability.
The rest of this chapter will give an introduction to the diﬀerent types of anonymizing
technologies - both for personal privacy and for censorship-resistant publishing, and look
at some of their weaknesses and strengths.
2.3 High-latency anonymity
Looking at the history of privacy enhancing technologies, there is wide agreement that
this expansive area of research was initiated by David Chaum’s paper on email mixes [17]
in 1981. Mixes are network nodes that accepts a (preferably) large number of messages
as inputs and send them out again them with varying new attributes, like new ap-
pearance, new/removed encryption layers, and optional random delays giving a new
message order in the output. This is the typical functionality for the early remailer ser-
vices, also called type 0 remailers. These type 0 remailers were services like Helsignius’
anon.penet.fi that stripped oﬀ identifying headers in emails, changed the “From”
address to an alias at anon.penet.fi, and forwarded the mail to the recipient. The
mapping between the originator’s email address and the alias was kept in a mapping
table at the anon.penet.fi service provider, and is one of this service’s weak points.
Another disadvantage is that the service’s construction as a single point of failure makes
it quite easy for an attacker monitoring the remailer service to statistically match the
input messages to the output messages. The service was later shut down due to legal
pressure to retrieve originator identities from the mapping table [48].
Later Cypherpunk remailer services, called type I remailers, are more complex and
involves a network of mixer nodes. These message based mixer technologies are usually
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Figure 2.1: Message appearance at the anonymizing network nodes in a sequence of
mixes using public key cryptography.
based on public key cryptography, where each consecutive mixer node has a public and
a private key (PuN and PrN). The message, M , is to be sent from a sender, S, to a
receiver with address, R, through the mixer nodes N1, N2, and N3. First the message,
M , is preceded with the address of the receiver, R. This new message with destination
address is now encrypted with the public key of N3, PuN3 , and preceded with the address
of the node N3 in the mixer chain. Then this is repeated - the new message is encrypted
with the public key of N2, preceded with the address of N2, and encrypted with the
public key of N1. The ﬁnal constructed message is shown on the top of Figure 2.1,
where the transformation of the message at the diﬀerent mixer nodes in the network
during sending is illustrated at individual lines. When node N1 receives the encrypted
message, it decrypts the message with its private key, PrN1 , recovers the address of the
next mixer, N2, and sends the remaining part to this node. N2 and N3 does the same,
and N3 is at the end left with the address of the receiver and the message to send there
without knowledge of the originator. There have been identiﬁed several vulnerabilities
to these ﬁrst types of mixer networks [85, 25, 58].
Type II remailer services like Mixmaster [71] and Babel [46] strengthen the relation-
ship anonymity, improve reply possibilities and address potential attacks like replay and
message length matching. But still they have weaknesses like the n-1 attack [11] and
trickle attack [97]. Type III remailers like Mixminion [25] attempts to address these
problems by adding long term pseudonyms, replay protection, and forward anonymity4.
An improvement to the mixer networks was proposed by Kesdogan et al. in Stop-
And-Go-MIXes [60]. Here the sender precalculates a delay with exponential distribution
for each packet at every mixer node and also sets a time window on each packet’s arrival
4Forward anonymity describes the situation where compromise of a long term encryption key does
not expose the anonymity in earlier communication. Analogous to (perfect) forward secrecy (PFS) [31].
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at the individual nodes. If the packet arrives within this time window it is delayed by
the precalculated value before sent to the next mix and is therefore more resistant to
active attacks such as deliberate delaying of packets. Other mixer technologies related
more to message anonymity than low-latency traﬃc are Ohkubo and Abe’s Hybrid
Mix [75, 52], Markus Jacobsson’s Flash Mix [51, 70] and George Danezis’ FS-mix [22].
But even high-latency mixer networks are vulnerable to some types of traﬃc analysis
attacks [68, 24].
2.4 Low-latency anonymity
The delays involved in the above mentioned technologies are not suitable for low-latency
interactive traﬃc, like web-browsing, where signiﬁcant amounts of the privacy related
information is revealed.
Low-latency anonymity were ﬁrst proposed by Pﬁtzmann et al. for ISDN commu-
nication [81], but the users had to use ﬁxed and equal bandwidth to a local telephone
switch. The proposed system and the scalability was unsuitable to scale towards an In-
ternet sized anonymity network. Another telephony based mixer system was proposed
by Jerichow et al. [55], but this thesis will only address technologies for anonymous
Internet communication from now on.
Anonymity networks are mainly using three anonymizing technology principles [40]
DC-networks, broadcast systems, and source rewriting systems, as shown in Figure 2.2.
These anonymizing technologies and some related protocols will be addressed individu-
ally in this section.
In addition to anonymity networks, there is the simplest anonymizing technology
for low-latency communication, the anonymizing proxy. Anonymizing proxies have been
commercially available since 1995 [4] and such services are still operative [88]. Anony-
mizing proxy services can be compared to one-node mixers similar to anon.penet.fi
keeping the location, i.e. IP-address of the originator, away from the accessed Internet
service and replacing it with the address of the anonymizing proxy. SafeWeb was a sim-
ilar commercial-but-free5 service enabling its users to anonymously access the web using
plain HTTPS encryption [29] to reach the SafeWeb anonymizing proxy. SafeWeb later
5Using banner ads instead of charging the users directly.
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Figure 2.2: Simple classiﬁcation of anonymizing technologies
added the software solution TriangleBoy [50] which enabled SafeWeb users to allow their
computers to be used as a one hop forwarding proxy for other SafeWeb users. Trian-
gleBoy would then allow people within restrictive ﬁrewalls to more easily ﬁnd available
and non-blocked service points. Both SafeWeb and TriangleBoy disappeared as services
after SafeWeb Inc. was acquired by Symantec in 2004.
Feamster et al. presented Infranet [37], a service that uses steganography inside plain
web content to transmit data retrieved by its servers back to the clients. The Infranet
servers are built to be indistinguishable from normal web servers so that traﬃc to and
from these unidentiﬁable servers appears like plain HTTP [38] traﬃc. One of the goals
for Infranet is to be an option bundled with standard web servers and thereby enabling
anyone to easily assist in preventing censorship and surveillance.
Many vulnerabilities have been located and demonstrated [49, 67] against proxy
services in general, but their main weaknesses are being a single point of failure, a single
point of compromise, and a single point of attack.
2.4.1 DC network
The dining cryptographers protocol, DC-net, was introduced by David Chaum [18] in
1988. A user of this network can achieve absolute anonymity within a group of users
cooperating at sending anonymous messages. The DC-net principle is that all n users
in an anonymity set (i.e. potential actors) share a bit-long secret with at least two other
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users. Each host then transmits the xor of all shared bits. The sum of all transmitted bits
will be divisible by two (xor all bits equals zero). If one user wants to send information,
it transmits the inverse of the actual value. This will not be noticeable individually by
the others, but the total xor will now be one and a proven anonymous transfer from the
group can take place. Later discussions on security and proposed improvements of the
DC-net protocol can be found in [106, 107].
Another protocol Herbivore [40], under development at Cornell University, will use
the DC-net principle by having multiple groups of users organized in cliques, and trans-
mitting information through one of the members in the clique. Each clique uses an
extended DC-net technology with reservation and transmission phases, and the clique
is self-controlled with regards to size. Herbivore will provide strong anonymity within
one clique.
The bandwidth overhead required in the DC-net protocol has made practical use of
DC-nets challenging and almost non-existent.
2.4.2 Broadcast protocols
Broadcast protocols have received less attention than the other technologies as they have
too much traﬃc overhead. A broadcast protocol will typically need all possible senders
to send a message to all potential receivers, which gives a huge extra network load in a
switched topology as this often is implemented using constant rate transmission to all
participants.
One of the few published anonymizing broadcast protocol is Peer-to-Peer Personal
Privacy Protocol, P 5 [100]. P 5 tries to enhance performance by dividing the members
into a hierarchy of broadcast groups, but still requires massive overhead traﬃc in addi-
tion to having the maximum available bandwidth limited by the constant transmission
rate.
2.4.3 Source-rewriting networks
The third and most mature anonymizing technology is source-rewriting networks. These
networks use many of the principles described in Section 2.3 on high-latency anonymity,
but have very low, if any, added delays during the traﬃc mixing at the network nodes.
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Figure 2.3: Onion routing setup of session keys using public key cryptography.
The ﬁrst distributed low-latency system for anonymous Internet communication was
onion routing [45, 86]. An onion routing network consists of several hops which proxy the
communication and each hop changes the appearance of the communication by adding
or removing an encryption layer. An anonymized communication channel through the
onion routing network, called a circuit, is initiated by the client using public key cryp-
tography to distribute session keys along the circuit. This initiating onion, shown on
top of Figure 2.3, is used to create a circuit from the client, C, through the onion router
nodes, N1 and N2, to Ne, the proxy node (called the exit node in later onion-routing
based protocols). Each node in the circuit “peels oﬀ” one layer from the onion and when
the onion has reached its destination, the client shares a session key KCN1 ,KCN2 ,KCNe ,
with each node in the circuit. These session keys are now used on the data passing
through the circuit. One of the major problems with the ﬁrst onion-router protocol was
the vulnerability for replay of the onions. A more complete security analysis for onion
routing is presented by Syverson et al. [104].
Freedom Network [12] from Zero-Knowledge Systems Inc., the ﬁrst commercial ano-
nymizing network, allowed the use of pseudonyms which also enabled them to counter
some of the potential abuse. For more information on the security of the Freedom
Network see [6, 5]. Rennhard and Plattner introduced MorphMix [89, 90], which is a
peer-to-peer based system using a witness node during the setup of the anonymizing
tunnel to counter collusion attacks, but had limited success [105]. Tarzan [39] and Ce-
bolla [15] uses the UDP protocol to construct an anonymity layer that is able to tunnel
IP traﬃc similar to a router. Tarzan also adds a scheme for cover traﬃc to improve
traﬃc ﬂow conﬁdentiality. A discussion on the eﬀects of cover traﬃc in mixer network
can be found in [10, 27, 65]. Goldberg and Wagner’s Rewebber [43] uses a network of en-
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crypting proxies for retrieving from and publishing information to the web. Using public
key cryptography and accessing the server software through HTTP requests, enables the
Rewebber network to be used to interact anonymously with normal web services.
All these anonymizing networks are originator controlled (Figure 2.2), meaning that
the originator (client) selects which nodes in the mixer network that is to be used. In
network controlled source rewriting systems the client only passes information to the
network and lets the network do the anonymization. Examples of these are Crowds [87],
Hordes [66, 101] and JAP [9].
Crowds, introduced by Reiter and Rubin in 1998, is a mixer network where every
node in the anonymizing network, the crowd, can ask another node in the network to
retrieve information on its behalf. The node throws a biased coin and evaluates to
fetch the information itself, or send the request on to another randomly selected node
in the crowd. When the coin results in retrieving information from the outside, the
node completes the request, e.g. downloading a web page, and sends the answer back
to the originator in the same (reversed) path. Hordes is an extension of Crowds that
improves the sign-on, the distribution of the hordes list, and reduces response times by
using multicast to anonymize the replies. Crowds and Hordes suﬀer from a number of
vulnerabilities [113, 104, 111, 112].
A network controlled mixer network used by many and still under development is
the Java Anon Proxy (JAP) [9]. JAP uses a local client side proxy to connect to the
ﬁrst mix in a cascade6 of mixes, where the last mixer is connected to a web cache proxy.
JAP has a large user base, but due to its functionality it is not amenable to the hidden
service design (cf. Section 2.6.1) and was therefore not used in the research work.
Several timing and traﬃc analysis vulnerabilities in these networks have been de-
scribed; Raymond [85], Back et al. [6], Zhu et al. [115], Kesdogan et al. [58, 59], Serjantov
and Sewell [98], and Danezis [23].
Katti et al. [57] recently introduced information slicing. This protocol splits a mes-
sage into multiple parts, slices, and sends them to the receiver through diﬀerent paths
of the anonymizing network. Only the receiver of all the slices will have enough infor-
mation to be able to decrypt the message. One promising thing about this protocol
is that it does not require public key cryptography and therefore no distributed key
6Chaum deﬁned[17] a mixer cascade to be a series of mixes where any of the mixes should be able
to provide secrecy of the correspondence between the input and output messages.
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management scheme.
Tor [33], the largest low-latency protocol and a protocol supporting hidden services
will be presented in Section 2.6.
2.5 Censorship-resistant publishing services
Anonymizing networks may give the anonymity needed to protect privacy and conﬁ-
dentiality from some clients’ perspective, but there are situations where the services
publishing the information require, need, or wish to remain anonymous. These are so-
called censorship-resistant publishing services. Many people suﬀer from governmental
censorship or are afraid of simply loosing their jobs, and are therefore made unable to
express or publish their concerns and opinions. But not only dissidents trying to pub-
lish information about situations not widely known, need these types of services. Other
scenarios likely to exist may be:
• Employees making their board of directors aware that the company is breaking
the law (e.g. following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [96]).
• A blogger on the inside of a ﬁrewall, e.g. on a shared IP address and therefore
unable to set up a normal web service accessible from the Internet. A hidden
service will be available through a most ﬁrewalls.
• Publishing a blogg that cannot be traced or shut down by the authorities in your
country.
The ﬁrst service designed to resist denial-of-service attacks was Ross Anderson’s
Eternity [3] service, distributing the service’s storage on many Eternity servers. The
service provides long term storage of data and uses payment as incentive for making
a large number of cooperating servers store a copy of the data, and thereby make the
data extremely hard to delete unless the attacker knows all servers. A proposal for
strengthening the Eternity service [7] has also been published.
Other systems that store the entire published document at multiple locations are
Freenet [19] and Publius [109]. Freenet uses a peer-to-peer network to resist censor-
ship and sustain availability even in the case where only one of the nodes is available.
Freenet’s peer-to-peer network is in itself a large storage area where the storage space
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is distributed among all the nodes of the network. Freenet is still under active devel-
opment [82]. Publius by Waldman et al. was designed for publishing content on the
web and to guarantee the persistence of stored ﬁles. Publius encrypts the stored ﬁle
and splits the encryption key using Shamir secret sharing [99] and spreads these key
shares on diﬀerent locations. A client must therefore have access to multiple servers for
retrieving the entire key and be able to read the content of the ﬁle.
Another method for censorship-resistance involves splitting the stored ﬁle into many
blocks and spread these blocks onto a subset of the system’s storage servers. Free-
Haven [32] uses a reputation system among its nodes involving contracts between the
servers for storing data for others. FreeHaven uses Rabin’s information dispersal algo-
rithm [83] to split the document into shares before distributing them onto the servers.
FreeHaven suﬀers from not deﬁning the underlying anonymous communication chan-
nel where many of the anonymity issues exists. Waldman and Mazie`re’s Tangler [108]
makes newly published documents dependent on previously published documents, and
this dependency is what the authors deﬁne as entanglement. Thereby Tangler creates
incentives for the storage and replication of older documents in addition to preventing
the servers from being in control of what the other servers may publish.
GNUnet [8] is a framework for peer-to-peer networking designed for anonymous
censorship-resistant ﬁle sharing. GNUnet is fully decentralized and does not have a
central trusted public service, but it has also been found vulnerable to location attacks
and to censorship [63]. Several other peer-to-peer storage systems [20, 35, 93] have been
developed and many are still in use. More information on these peer-to-peer networks
and darknets7 and current peer-to-peer implementations can be found on-line searching
for protocols like BitTorrent, WASTE, KaZaA, FastTrack, and LimeWire.
2.6 Tor and Hidden Services
Tor [33] is the largest public anonymizing network currently in use. Tor builds upon
onion routing technology and uses a network of routing nodes (Tor servers) to transport
traﬃc for the users (Tor clients). Tor was deployed in 2003, updated to support hidden
services (cf. Section 2.6.1) in 2004, consists currently of approximately 1000 active Tor
7A darknet is a private virtual network where its users communicate only with other users they
somehow trust.
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server nodes and an estimated 200.000+ weekly users, and has until now never been
down.
Wei Dai presented in PipeNet [21] an anonymizing technique where the client estab-
lished a connection through an anonymizing network by extending one hop at a time,
and exchange an ephemeral encryption key with each node in the connection path. Tor
uses the same principle to construct a circuit through the set of Tor servers.
All communication between the Tor nodes (client to server, and server to server)
uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) [29] to create forward secrecy (FS) [31] on every
communication link. Forward secrecy is important to prevent any attack to compromise
and access earlier communication information. If the TLS link is not present when the
nodes starts a communication channel, the TLS session is created ﬁrst. The TLS links
are left out of the rest of the description of Tor and its hidden services as they are always
present on every communication link between two Tor nodes.
One of the major problems of all anonymizing networks is bootstrapping, i.e. how
to locate and start using the anonymous network. This is often the simplest way of
blocking an anonymous service [62]. Tor uses a directory service where the directory
servers have their identities and public keys hard coded (but conﬁgurable) in the client
code. The use of the Tor directory service is at the time of writing undergoing signiﬁcant
changes to address vulnerabilities in the original design [33]:
• By stopping access to the directory servers the clients will be unable to download
the list of server nodes and thereby not able to connect to the network.
• By forcing the client to download all the server nodes, the network will meet
problems scaling the network size.
• One of the directory servers could construct false information and make a large
portion of the network believe it.
The directory service distributes a signed list of server nodes, with the nodes’ (self-
announced) network bandwidth and contact information, i.e. IP address and port num-
bers.
For the Tor client to use the anonymizing network, it ﬁrst selects which server nodes
to use in the circuit (currently the default number of hops is three) and selects by random
three server nodes in the network. This random selection uses the nodes announced
bandwidth to weigh the random selection, making a node with 10Mbit bandwidth ten
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Figure 2.4: Setup of circuit through the Tor network.
times more likely to be chosen than a node with 1Mbit bandwidth. This enables the
network to distribute load more equally among the participating server nodes8. The
abuse of the Tor server nodes’ self-announced values is discussed and implemented in
Paper C [77] and is a known vulnerability in Tor.
The ﬁnal tunnel, the anonymizing circuit, is shown in Figure 2.4 for a client accessing
a public server through the nodes N3, N5, and N7. The circuit is established by
the client connecting to the ﬁrst node, N3, and using ephemeral Diﬃe-Hellman[30] to
exchange a session key used for encrypting the communication between the two nodes.
A classical man-in-the-middle attack on Diﬃe-Hellman is avoided by encrypting the
client’s Diﬃe-Hellman value with the server node’s public RSA key. After the secure
connection to N3 is established, the client sends a message to N3 and asks it to extend
the circuit to node N5, where the client again uses an authenticated Diﬃe-Hellman to
exchange a session key directly with N5 without letting N5 know at which node the
key exchange originates. From the perspective of N5, the originator could be N3, but
it could also be any node, client or server, inside the Tor network. The same extension
is completed from N5 towards N7 and the client may now anonymously communicate
with N7. The client is then ready to setup anonymous communication sessions to public
services on the outside of the anonymizing network using N7 as the exit node, accessing
these services on the client’s behalf. Note that for every step of the circuit towards
the exit node, one layer of encryption on the traﬃc data is removed, meaning that the
client adds three layers of encryption for each packet traveling out, and each node in the
circuit removes one layer before forwarding the packet. This way the packet will appear
8As there is a limited and small number of exit nodes available, the selection of nodes also attempts
to take this into consideration. This work is currently in active development.
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diﬀerent at every node in the path and avoid being traced. TLS will also provide change
of appearance to external adversaries, but if nodes within the anonymizing network are
colluding, then a packet without this internal change of appearance will be traceable
at two diﬀerent non-adjacent server nodes, e.g. at N3 and N7 in this example. When
sending reply data from the public service back to the client, this process is reversed
and each node instead adds a layer of encryption so the client then has to remove all
three layers upon arrival of the packet.
Applications running on the client can now tunnel TCP sessions9 through this anony-
mous tunnel by using a SOCKS [61, 64] interface and thereby enabling all TCP client
connections to be tunneled over to the exit node and be established as if originating at
the exit node. A client can multiplex several connections over the same anonymizing
tunnel, but the user must be aware that unencrypted protocols will be visible to the exit
server. So if one connection is used for anonymous surﬁng, it will compromise anonymity
to e.g. post a blog or authenticate in another way through the same tunnel.
Since the Tor server network is open for anyone10 to join, it is vulnerable to the Sybil
attack [34], where an attacker inserts (or controls) many nodes of the network without
the other users’ knowledge. And as long as the communication channels between the
servers are over public channels, several other vulnerabilities will also exist [74, 85, 58,
65, 102]
2.6.1 Hidden Services
In 2004 the Tor developers released an upgrade to the anonymizing network that included
a method to add so-called hidden services inside the network. These services were
designed [33] to resist denial-of-service attacks and be unable to locate, i.e. not ﬁnd
the service’s IP address and thereby its physical location. So by setting up a hidden
service, no one, not even the service’s own users, should be able to locate it or prevent
the service from being available. The Tor hidden services is is a general service hiding
technique that can be used by many anonymizing networks, and is not speciﬁc only to
Tor.
A hidden service is not a publishing service itself, but simply a method of accessing
9Tor supports only TCP sessions as it runs over TLS. Supporting UDP (or IP) over a TCP based
channel raises a lot of challenges, and a new design from the ground up is likely to be constructed ﬁrst.
10Anyone with a server accessible at a public IP address.
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a hidden Internet service through an anonymizing network. In order to address when
to use these hidden services, the Tor network uses a URL with the virtual “top-level
domain” .onion. Every time a Tor client is requested to access a server name ending
in .onion, the client knows that this is a connection to a hidden service and downloads
the hidden service’s contact information from the directory service (anonymously). The
principle of hidden services is that the anonymity client and the hidden service agree
upon connecting to a rendezvous point using plain anonymizing connections. When
the rendezvous point connects these two circuits, the client and the hidden service are
able to communicate privately without knowing where the other part is located, and
without the rendezvous server knowing who is communicating, nor what kind of data is
exchanged. More details on Tor hidden services can be found in Part II of the thesis.
Attacks on hidden services have often been related to the diﬀerent attacks on the
Tor anonymity network itself [113, 73]. Others, like Murdoch’s clock-skew attack [72]
directed speciﬁcally towards hidden services have addressed how to reveal the location of
the hidden service. But ﬁnding the location is not the only attack vector against hidden
services. Other threats against the current hidden services design have been identiﬁed
already in the original design paper [33], but have received less academic attention.
Denial-of-service attacks without locating the hidden service’s IP address is still possible,
e.g. by blocking access to the directory service where the contact information is held,
or by blocking access to the introduction points where the hidden service is listening
for connection requests. Using a separate set of directory servers for hidden services,
and combining this with the use of distributed hash tables like CAN [84], Chord [103],
Pastry [94], or Tapestry [114], could be implemented to support the storage, lookup, and
retrieval of hidden services’ contact information, and would increase attack-resistance
on the directory servers as mentioned in Part II.
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3 Contribution and Summary
The thesis consists of the following ﬁve research papers:
Paper A Lasse Øverlier, Tønnes Brekne and Andre´ A˚rnes. Non-expanding Trans-
action Speciﬁc Pseudonymization for IP Traﬃc Monitoring. In Yvo G.
Desmedt, Huaxiong Wang, Yi Mu, and Yongqing Li, editors, Cryptology and
Network Security: 4th International Conference (CANS 2005), pages 261–273.
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 3810, December 2005.
Paper B Geir Hallingstad and Lasse Øverlier. Traﬃc Flow Conﬁdentiality in a
Future Network Enabled Capability Environment. In Proceedings of the
2007 IEEE Information Assurance and Security Workshop., pages 325–332. IEEE,
June 2007.
Paper C Lasse Øverlier and Paul Syverson. Locating Hidden Servers. In Pro-
ceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P’06), pages
100–114, May 2006. IEEE Computer Society.
Paper D Lasse Øverlier and Paul Syverson. Valet Services: Improving Hidden
Servers with a Personal Touch. In George Danezis and Philippe Golle, edi-
tors, Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET
2006), pages 223–244, Cambridge, UK, June 2006. Springer-Verlag, LNCS 4258.
Paper E Lasse Øverlier and Paul Syverson. Improving eﬃciency and simplicity
of Tor circuit establishment and hidden services. In Proceedings of the
Seventh Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS 2007), pages 134–
152, Ottawa, Canada, June 2007. Springer-Verlag, LNCS 4776.
The time line in Figure 3.1 shows how the diﬀerent papers are interconnected through
the research period - improving the security and speed of anonymous communication
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Figure 3.1: Papers and time line
and hidden services. The ﬁrst two papers were completed in parallel works in cooper-
ation with diﬀerent research teams while initializing the hidden services research. The
following three papers address the vulnerabilities, challenges and improvements around
anonymous communication and location hidden services.
3.1 Contribution of Paper A
Non-expanding Transaction Speciﬁc Pseudonymization for IP
Traﬃc Monitoring
This paper [76] presents a solution to securely pseudonymize IP addresses in high speed,
large scale traﬃc data collections, while still maintaining a secure, ﬂexible and con-
ﬁgurable method of searching for data in these logs. As the security of anonymous
communications is directly related to the possibility, availability and searchability of
traﬃc data logs, common interests with researchers from the LOBSTER and SCAMPI
EU-projects were identiﬁed. This paper was a result from cooperation with researchers
working at the Centre for Quantiﬁable Quality of Service in Communication Systems in
Trondheim.
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One problem of earlier pseudonymization schemes for IP address logs is the narrow
span of possible IP addresses. For IPv4 even a complete address span with combined
IPfrom, IPto is only 64-bit wide, which regardless of earlier methods of pseudonymiza-
tion will be vulnerable to diﬀerent types of attacks [14, 13]. Another important aspect
is to avoid expanding the logs, as the logs are to be implemented on high speed inter-
connections of the Internet which already carry traﬃc in the multi-gigabit range.
A new secure logging scheme is suggested in this paper, describing how to construct
a non-expanding transaction speciﬁc pseudonymization by using stream ciphers. Indi-
vidual strong stream ciphers are applied to each bit column of the n-bit traﬃc data.
This way n stream cipher keys will protect one bit column each of traﬃc data, and
searching inside individual columns can be enabled by sharing only the necessary keys.
The logging scheme is non-expanding as it adds no extra data and is therefore able to
keep the logs to a minimum which is highly relevant in these interconnections. The
technique also enables transaction speciﬁc pseudonyms to be constructed for each row
of data which will protect the logs from injection attacks. To further reduce the po-
tential for abuse it is suggested to rotate encryption keys1 after each block of k rows
has been pseudonymized, and thereby limiting the amount of traﬃc data available to an
attacker. The pseudonymization scheme presented can also be used to cover logging and
searching of traﬃc data (i.e. content), not only IP addresses. The scheme is suitable for
parallelization and is therefore also eligible for an eﬃcient hardware implementation.
3.2 Contribution of Paper B
Traﬃc Flow Conﬁdentiality in a Future Network Enabled Capa-
bility Environment
This paper [47] is an analysis of how traﬃc ﬂow conﬁdentiality will become a challenge
in military network enabled capability (NEC) environments [16]. These future networks
require a high degree of ﬂexibility for eﬃcient exchange of information. This will likely
move information protection closer to the edge of the network i.e. towards the highest
layers in the standard network model. On the other side, high demand for availability
will likely move integrity protection towards lower levels to eliminate rogue traﬃc already
1Actually it is the initialization vectors (IVs) that are rotated for each block of data.
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at the source. Now both the integrity and conﬁdentiality of NEC environments will
secure the network, and the paper makes an analysis of how this enhanced ﬂexibility
inﬂuences the adversary’s potential for traﬃc ﬂow analysis.
A Friendly Force Tracing Scenario using satellite communication to create situation
reports and allow the exchange of messages, is used as an example to analyze the problem
of traﬃc ﬂow conﬁdentiality in the scenarios of encryption applied at the link level, IP
level (IPsec), and at the object level.
The paper shows how this future scenario leaks traﬃc ﬂow information at the dif-
ferent network levels, how the existing countermeasures will not eﬀectively help this
without compromising the wanted ﬂexibility and availability. Not even anonymous
communication using hidden services can accomplish this without introducing some key
management scheme and lower layer conﬁdentiality which would terminate this ﬂexibil-
ity.
3.3 Contribution of Paper C
Locating Hidden Servers
The main contribution of this paper [77] is the demonstration of eﬀective intersection
attacks in a live anonymizing network, and the introduction and analysis of diﬀerent
countermeasures against these attacks.
The research shows how an attacker can locate the IP address of a hidden server in
a matter of minutes by controlling only one compromised/evil node in the Tor server
network. Using only one node the location attack can be performed within a couple of
minutes or at most a couple of hours, and by using two nodes the attack will always
succeed within a few minutes. As shown in the paper, a connection to a hidden service is
completed when the hidden service connects back to the rendezvous point. By opening
connections to a hidden service again and again, thereby forcing the hidden server to
connect back to the rendezvous point through diﬀerent random circuits, the attacker
can use statistical methods to locate the hidden server’s IP address. First the evil node
uses timing analysis to determine whether it has been made part of the circuit from the
hidden server to the rendezvous point. If this is conﬁrmed and the IP address of the
previous nodes are stored in a list, the hidden server’s IP address will be over-represented
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in the list. This is more commonly known as an intersection attack, or the predecessor
attack.
Countermeasures discussed are dummy traﬃc, extended circuit length, and entry
guard nodes. Of these only entry guard nodes, a small set of preselected permanent
nodes used as ﬁrst nodes for all anonymous connections, is shown to be a countermeasure
that signiﬁcantly reduces the success rate of the attack. The paper makes an analysis
of the possible variations of entry guard nodes and completes an experiment using the
same attack when entry guard nodes are implemented. The paper shows that by using
entry guard nodes an attacker will be able to identify the location of these entry guard
nodes, but not the location of the hidden server. Using backup guard nodes - a list of
preselected spare nodes, or layered guard nodes - where each guard node has its own list
of second level guard nodes for the next hop, will further slow down the attack.
As a result from the attention the research work received, the report and a live
demonstration of the attack was presented at two other conferences2 in addition to its
publication release. Recent work by Abbot et al. [2] has already extended this attack into
locating Tor clients using the same principles and this paper’s traﬃc pattern matching
algorithms.
3.4 Contribution of Paper D
Valet Services: Improving Hidden Servers with a Personal Touch
Until now most published work on hidden services have focused on the vulnerability
of locating the hidden servers and almost no work have focused on another important
design goal for the hidden services, censorship-resistance. There were known problems
with the existing hidden service design making it possible for an attacker to stop a
hidden service by launching a DoS attack on the introduction points or on the directory
servers.
The main contribution of this paper [78] is the introduction of the valet nodes,
created to reduce a hidden service’s vulnerability to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and
add quality of service (QoS) as a service option to both anonymous and authenticated
users of a hidden service. Additionally valet nodes not only hides the introduction points
2BlackHat Federal http://blackhat.com/, and ShmooCon http://shmoocon.org/.
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from being located, but the research shows how to hide the very existence of a hidden
service from everyone but the users knowing the exact service address.
Recalling that the introduction points are vulnerable to attacks, the valet nodes
protect the introduction points by hiding the introduction point’s identity from the
clients. In addition neither the valet nodes nor the introduction points knows which
service they are being used for. The information for connecting to a hidden service is
located in contact information tickets (CIT) containing a description of the valet nodes
and an encrypted extension message for the valet node identifying which introduction
point the valet node should extend the circuit to. The client will not at any time know
which introduction points are being used, and cannot target them for attacks. By having
more than one valet node per introduction point, and reducing the probability of a client
knowing all valet nodes, the probability of a successful denial-of-service attack on the
service is signiﬁcantly reduced.
To hide the very existence of a hidden service the network has to restrict access to
the hidden service’s CITs. This is accomplished by encrypting both the CITs and the
CIT identiﬁers with keys derived from the hidden service’s public key. The consequence
of this is that the client must have access to the public key, which is the hidden service’s
uniﬁed resource locator, in order to both access and decrypt the contact information
ticket. No one else will be able to identify the CIT nor the address (URL) of a hidden
service. The dynamics of these descriptors can be high, involving valid time periods,
client authentication tokens, and other types of cookies. The descriptors can always
be veriﬁed as the CITs are signed with the (already known) public key of the hidden
service. Updates of these CITs are made possible and veriﬁable by using a reverse hash
chain scheme.
A deeper analysis of the security in locating all introduction points is completed
using varying numbers of introduction points and valet nodes per introduction point.
E.g. by using three valet nodes for each of the hidden service’s three introduction points,
an attacker must control 100 nodes in a 500 node anonymizing network in order to have
a 12% chance of locating all three introduction points.
The paper also describes how quality of service for both authenticated and anony-
mous users can be added through the use of valet nodes and CITs, and how the valet
nodes scheme is not inﬂuenced if the anonymizing network starts to use distributed hash
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tables as a replacement for directory services.
3.5 Contribution of Paper E
Improving eﬃciency and simplicity of Tor circuit establishment
and hidden services
This paper [79] proposes a protocol for Tor circuit establishment that eliminates the need
for RSA encryption and decryption, and it also suggests how to let the new protocol
improve the valet node design by eliminating the need for an external rendezvous point.
In Tor circuit setup a client must interact and setup encrypted tunnels with each
node in the path towards the exit node. As the clients know the identity of the server
nodes through a signed certiﬁcate and a public RSA key, the client can only conﬁrm
the server node’s identity by either encrypting a message or conﬁrming a signature with
the node’s public key. This is in the current implementation of anonymous circuits
involving three (the length of the anonymizing tunnel) RSA encryptions/decryptions on
the client side, and one encryption/decryption on each of the nodes in the path. Since
the current Tor implementation uses RSA in addition to the Diﬃe-Hellman ephemeral
key exchange, this paper proposes a new protocol combining authentication and key
exchange by using predistributed Diﬃe-Hellman (DH) values for each of the server
nodes in the Tor network.
All nodes publish a list of individual descriptors, e.g. IP address, TCP ports, RSA
public key(s), nickname, etc. This list is signed with a private RSA key and used
for authentication when connecting to a node. By adding a public DH-value3 to this
list of signed identiﬁers we can use this value as the node’s public DH-value during
the initial handshake. Security is maintained by rotating this value regularly. Then
a half-authenticated setup can be completed if the client constructs a message like
“DHc, EK{data}”, where DHc is the clients ephemeral public DH-value for this connec-
tion, EK is the DH-key derived from the clients private DH-value, and the server node’s
public DH-value. Only the server node with access to the associated private DH-value
will be able to derive the correct key and decrypt data. This is more commonly known
as an ElGamal key agreement [69, p. 517], or a half-certiﬁed Diﬃe-Hellman. The sim-
3The paper proposes to add a list of these DH-values with diﬀerent validity periods for each of the
anonymizing servers as these descriptor lists are updated regularly anyway.
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pliﬁcation eliminates the RSA encryption and saves three exponentiations on the client,
and one on each of the other nodes in the circuit.
The paper also demonstrates how to reduce the number of exchanged messages in
various circuit setup scenarios, and makes an analysis on the security of these proposed
protocols. In addition the research shows how an improved protocol extending the
ElGamal key agreement can utilize forward secrecy immediately after the key exchange
has been completed. This increases the number of exponentiations again from the earlier
proposed low limit, but it is still fewer than the original RSA based protocol as many
of the exponentiations may be processed when idle and not during circuit setup.
The hidden service’s circuit setup will also gain from these predistributed DH-values
as valet nodes are more easily implemented, and because the rendezvous point may be
eliminated. The new protocol may use ephemeral introduction points where the com-
munication continues to use the initial introduction point circuit. Another possibility
discussed is to use the last circuit node in front of the valet node as a rendezvous point,
thereby eliminating the need for a separate client-to-rendezvous point connection.
3.6 Summary of thesis contribution
Network anonymity is a wide area of research including anonymous email, anonymous
browsing and access of services, and censorship-resistant publishing. This thesis has
contributed with an analysis of traﬃc ﬂow conﬁdentiality and anonymizing networks,
and found methods to make sure that it is possible to have secure and ﬂexible transaction
speciﬁc pseudonymous logging of traﬃc data.
As the EU data retention directive [36] currently is being implemented, the transac-
tion speciﬁc pseudonymous logging technique is well suited for securing the many high
speed communication logs that will be created. In addition, the solution enables the
search of some data areas inside the logged data without revealing all data, meaning
that it is possible to ﬁnd out if an activity has been committed without giving away
the identity (location) of the user until the assumed activity is conﬁrmed.
The thesis has demonstrated that intersection attacks do work in live networks, by
implementing the predecessor attack in the Tor network, and that a location attack on
hidden services can be completed using multiple methods with only one or two malicious
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nodes. The time to locate a hidden service using only one evil node was shown to vary
from a couple of minutes to, at the highest, a couple of hours. After the entry guard
node countermeasures were implemented the research conﬁrmed the assumption that
these guard nodes could be found, but not the hidden service itself. The hidden service
has thereby been added an extra layer of protection and more direct attacks on the
guard nodes must be completed in order to attempt to locate the hidden service.
The research has shown how the use of valet nodes enhances the hidden services’
resistance to denial-of-service attacks by protecting their introduction points. In ad-
dition the valet nodes technique enables the possibility of completely hidden services,
methods for individual or group based quality of service for the users, and methods to
avoid using the rendezvous point in the hidden service connection setup. The number
of valet nodes used for each introduction point has also been shown to decrease the
probability of locating all introduction points from one (existing solution today lists all
introduction points) to almost zero unless the attacker controls a major portion of the
anonymizing network.
A general improvement of the authenticated Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange has been
presented eliminating the need for the RSA encryption and decryption by using pre-
distributed Diﬃe-Hellman values. This has reduced the number of encryptions and the
number of messages necessary for setting up an anonymous circuit while maintaining
forward secrecy. The solution is also easily adaptable to the valet nodes design which
will beneﬁt from the use of public DH-values and also avoid the use of RSA. In addition
the latency in connecting to hidden services may be reduced without setting up new
connections to external rendezvous points.
3.7 Further research
Inside the main area of the research work there have been identiﬁed multiple ﬁelds for
further research. First there is testing and/or simulating the various extended guard
nodes schemes, where the layered guard node scheme might be the most interesting
case. By simulating a variable number of guard nodes for each layer and constructing
scenarios with a variable number of colluding nodes, it should be easier to estimate the
change in anonymity protection on both hidden services and clients of the anonymizing
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network.
Second, there continues to be more research into location threats of hidden services
than accessibility threats, so this area of research is only in its beginning. Implementing
valet nodes and contact information tickets to look at performance and security issues
are the ﬁrst natural extensions of this work. In addition many research questions arises
when moving from directory servers, e.g. towards a distributed hash table lookup ser-
vice. Update, trust, reliability and synchronization, are only a few of the problems a
new replacement for the directory servers must look into. More general problems with
anonymizing networks is ongoing research, like adding blocking resistance and how to
make the anonymizing traﬃc to look like normal Internet traﬃc, etc.
Many anonymity issues are also related to the contact information tickets and the
use of valet nodes. By allowing a client accessing a hidden service to get diﬀerent
quality-of-service based on e.g. previous behavior, there is the question on whether
the client can remain anonymous and have this previous behavior remain as detached
events and therefore unlinkable. In addition a better analysis of the situation where
a completely hidden service (secret hidden key with optional authorization) has its
public key exposed. There exists at the moment no better solution but to “re-hide” the
service by redistributing a new public key, which is both cumbersome and has several
vulnerabilities.
The proposed Diﬃe-Hellman enhancement should also be followed up by a more
formal analysis of the protocol, and an evaluation of the diﬀerent cryptographic meth-
ods that can be used to achieve the half-certiﬁed key exchange. Before changing the
connection to the hidden service, a more formal analysis of the security in the proposed
protocols should be completed.
In addition the research performed on pseudonymous logging should be followed up
by looking at more eﬀective search and statistical algorithms for the proposed protection
scheme. And it should be constructed hardware tests and implementations of the secure
logging and search algorithms to see how hardware performance of the pseudonymization
scheme will be. This research might reveal how the proposed pseudonymization scheme
can keep up with the continuously increasing bandwidth and log capacity which service
providers will be required to provide, keep secure, and made searchable upon request.
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